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Saticoy Bay LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 3 (Jan. 26, 2017)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
Summary
The Court held that under NRCP 41(e) a complaint in intervention is a part of an original
action, and thus, the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint was mandatory. However,
the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice because the
district court mischaracterized NRS 116.3116(6) as a statute of limitations when it only limits the
amount of actionable unpaid HOA assessments. Finally, the Court found that appellant’s
subsequent action would not be barred by statute of limitations.
Background:
This matter involves the dismissal of an action contesting the ownership of three separate
Las Vegas properties: Lot 21, Lot 22, and Lot 26 (the Property). In 2013, appellant Saticoy Bay
LLC Series 2021 Gray Eagle Way (Saticoy) allegedly obtained titles to Lots 21 and 26 through
homeowner association foreclosure deeds and through a quitclaim deed for Lot 22 on December
3, 2013. In 2012, the beneficial interest of a deed of trust recorded against the Property was
assigned to respondent JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMorgan).
In 2009, the Canyon Gate Master Association’s (CGMA) took steps to foreclose on the
property, but their actions were delayed by legal challenges from then owner Susan Hannaford.
However, in 2013, CGMA again took steps to initiate foreclosure on the property. On May 23,
2013, Saticoy appeared at the foreclosure sale and purchased Lots 21 and 26, and in October,
2013 purportedly purchased Lot 22 directly from CGMA. In August 2013, Saticoy filed a
complaint in intervention to Hannaford’s pending action seeking injunctive relief, quiet title,
declaratory relief, and issuance of a writ of restitution. JPMorgan filed an answer to Saticoy’s
complaint in intervention. In 2015, the District court dismissed Saticoy’s complaint with
prejudice finding that (1) Saticoy had not “taken affirmative steps to adequately prosecute the
case,” (2) Saticoy’s excuse was an inadequate excuse for delay, (3) Saticoy’s case lacked merit,
and (4) NRS 116.3116(6)’s three-year limitation period for foreclosing an HOA lien had run.
Discussion
NRCP 41(e) states that: “any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be
dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been commenced … unless such action is
brought to trial within 5 years after the plaintiff has filed the action.”2 The Court has previously
explained that “an action includes the original claim and any crossclaims, counterclaims, and
third-party claims.3Thus, the question to be decided was whether complaints in intervention filed
in the original action fall into the above framework. NRCP 24 governs complaints in intervention
and permits parties “intervene in an action,”4and such parties in intervention have been treated
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under NRCP 24 as intervenors in the original action both in Nevada,5 and in other jurisdictions.6
Thus, the Court concludes that complaints in intervention are part of the original action for
purposes of mandatory dismissal under NRCP41(e), and since Saticoy failed to timely prosecute
its claims in intervention, dismissal was mandatory.
The district court’s dismissal of Saticoy’s complaint in intervention with prejudice, however, was
an abuse of discretion
“A district court has broad, but not unbridled, discretion in determining whether dismissal
under NRCP 41(e) should be with or without prejudice.”7 To determine if there was an abuse of
discretion, the Court looked to the district court’s application of the Monroe elements which
include the following: “the underlying conduct of the parties, whether the plaintiff offers
adequate excuse for the delay, whether the plaintiff’s case lacks merit, and whether any
subsequent action following dismissal would not be barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.”8
Conduct of the parties and adequacy of excuse for delay
The Court disagreed with the district court finding that Saticoy had not taken adequate
steps to prosecute its claims and offered no adequate excuse for delay. The Court has found that
“[b]ecause the law favors trial on the merits, … dismissal with prejudice may not be warranted
where … delay is justified by the circumstances of the case.”9 To consider whether dismissal
with prejudice is appropriate, the Court considers “the conduct and good faith belief of the
parties.”10 The Court found that and delay was justified in this case because Saticoy promptly
filed its complaint in August 2013 after acquiring interest in Lots 21 and 26 July 2013.
The district court misapplied NRS 116.3116(6) to the merits of Saticoy’s claims
Under NRS 116.3116(6) proceedings to enforce a lien must be instituted “within 3 years
after the full amount of the assessments become[] due.”11 Parties did not dispute that CGMA
had a valid lien for assessments against the property so the Court looked at whether that lien was
extinguished by the three-year limitation period in NRS 116.3116(6). To resolve the issue the
Court had to determine what action was sufficient to meet the requirement of instituting
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“proceedings to enforce the lien.”12 Under NRS 116.31162(1), an HOA may foreclose its lien by
sale only after it takes the following steps.13 First, the HOA must provide to the homeowner a
“notice of delinquent assessment,”14 next, the HOA must record a notice of default and election
to sell the unit to satisfy the lien.15 and finally, the HOA must give the homeowner a 90-day
grace period following the recording of the notice of default and election to sell before it
continues foreclosure proceedings.16 Therefore, no actions can be taken unless and until the
HOA provides a notice of delinquent assessments pursuant to NRS 116.31162(1)(a).17 As such, a
party has instituted “proceedings to enforce the lien” for purposes of NRS 116.3116(6) when it
provides the notice of delinquent assessment. This assessment conforms to the Court’s past
decision where it stated that “to initiate foreclosure under NRS 116.31162 through NRS
116.31168, a Nevada HOA must notify the owner of the delinquent assessments.”18
The Court found that the district court erred and treated NRS 116.3116(6) as a statute of
limitations when it instead determines the expiration of past due assessments. NRS 116.3116(6)
limits the amount of unpaid assessments upon which an HOA can foreclose to those that have
become due within three years of the instituting proceedings to enforce the lien.19 Therefore, the
district court incorrectly relied on NRS 116.3116(6) when it found Saticoy’s claim lacked merit.
Saticoy's subsequent action is not barred by the applicable statute of Limitations
Finally, the district court erred in concluding that Saticoy could not refile a subsequent
action following dismissal, because the action would be a NRS 11.080 complaint for quite title
which contains a five-year statute of limitations.20 Since Saticoy did not acquire interest in the
Property until 2013, the statute of limitations for a quite title action would not run until 2018.
Conclusion
The Court found that “Saticoy’s complaint in intervention was part of the original action
for purposes of NRCP 41 (e), and thus dismissal of the complaint was mandatory.” However, the
district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice because “Saticoy took adequate
steps to prosecute the action, delay was justified, and a subsequent action would not be barred by
the statute of limitations.”
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